Omar Afghan
After the year 2021, following the departure of all occupying forces from our esteemed country of Afghanistan, Pakistan expressed its satisfaction at the return of the Islamic Emirate (IEA) to power in Afghanistan. It demonstrated to the world that the leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are our people, willing to heed our counsel.
Even speaking on behalf of Afghanistan in international conferences and not respecting the concept of good neighborliness in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.
Pakistan did not cease its actions at this point. When the caretaker government was announced in Afghanistan and the national issues of the country were addressed, Pakistan recognized that Afghanistan is now progressing significantly towards establishing a strong and Islamic central government. Therefore, a policy should be implemented to keep the leaders of the Islamic Emirate under its control.
Subsequently, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) outlined its foreign policy directives with all countries, particularly with neighboring nations. Key themes in this diplomatic approach included non-interference in internal affairs, a focus on economy-based politics, and fostering positive relations with neighboring states.
Based on the above policy, the Afghan government proposed a goodwill gesture to Pakistan to conduct negotiations with armed groups, most notably the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), through Afghan mediation in Kabul, with the aim of achieving political stability in Pakistan, a neighboring country sharing many similarities with Afghanistan.
Regrettably, Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus, influenced by external powers, executed a coup against Pakistan’s civilian government, undermining the efforts undertaken by Imran Khan’s administration to address and assimilate armed opposition factions.
Exploiting this situation, the military and intelligence agencies of Pakistan embarked on a campaign of propaganda against the Islamic Emirate across national and international platforms, alleging that the Islamic Emirate harbored terrorists within Afghan territory, thus violating the Doha agreement which stipulated that terrorist groups would not be permitted within Afghanistan.
In a commitment to the principle of good neighborliness, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan expressed willingness to endure these baseless accusations propagated by Pakistan.
Nonetheless, the Emirate declared that no country, including Pakistan, would face any threats emanating from Afghan territory, and affirmed that Afghanistan would not harbor any destructive groups that posed a danger to its neighbors.
Observing the Islamic Emirate’s strategic patience, Pakistan escalated its propaganda efforts against the Emirate through various media channels, disseminating analyses, articles, interviews, videos, and narratives.
Former Pakistani military and intelligence officials embarked on a series of accusations on the global stage, striving to depict the situation in Afghanistan as dire and alarming.
From these policies, it appears that Pakistan is uninterested in having a peaceful, stable, and developed Afghanistan as its neighbor. Instead, Pakistan seems to prefer that Afghanistan remain in a state of weakness and dependency on Pakistan.
Pakistan does not desire an Afghanistan that possesses a strong government and army capable of safeguarding the historical borders of the country and promptly responding should its territorial integrity be endangered.
If we briefly examine Pakistan’s political history, Pakistan’s stance towards Afghanistan can be outlined in the following points:
— The Durand Line issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan:
Pakistan views the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary and harbors fears that a strong government in Afghanistan could reignite this contentious issue.
— Pakistan perceives Afghanistan as its strategic depth:
— Pakistan considers Afghanistan as its strategic depth: Over the past four decades, it has become clear that Afghanistan is the center of competition between Pakistan and India.
— Afghanistan is viewed by Pakistan as its market of consumption
The primary economic objective of Pakistan lies in disrupting Afghanistan’s fundamental projects and impeding reconstruction efforts. With these strategies, Pakistan has positioned Afghanistan as a consumption hub for materials that are forbidden in Pakistan, aiming to make Afghanistan dependent on Pakistan across various domains, especially in healthcare and scientific fields. Nevertheless, with the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, these aspirations have been thwarted as the Islamic Emirate prioritized the core projects of Afghanistan to alleviate the population from perpetual poverty.
— Playing with the world regarding Afghanistan:
Pakistan has amassed considerable experience in manipulating international powers over Afghanistan to further its self-interests over the past four decades. This is why Pakistan continues to hold a disparaging view of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, believing it can manipulate global politics to its advantage.
— Pakistan perceives it can simultaneously assume two conflicting roles; playing with fire and water:
Pakistan perceives it can simultaneously assume two conflicting roles, playing with fire and water as it upholds a strategic partnership with America and maintains a strategic relationship with China. Playing such a role necessitates unique skills; however, in international politics, interests always take precedence. Pakistan cannot simultaneously uphold the interests of the West and the East. In attempting to do so, Pakistan will either fall victim to its own actions or be compelled to make sacrifices involving others.
How should the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan respond to these policies?
• Pakistan utilizes Afghan refugees as leverage; hence, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan should establish a systematic plan to resettle all Afghan refugees within the country;
• Afghanistan’s foreign policy should not succumb to the dictates of the East and West but should uphold neutrality, equilibrium, economic focus, and be rooted in Afghanistan’s national interests;
• Pakistan must be persuaded through various means that the progress and prosperity of Afghanistan equate to comparable gains for Pakistan;
• Emphasis should be placed on bolstering Afghanistan’s institutions, notably in water management and healthcare, to emancipate Afghanistan from dependency on Pakistan;
• The Islamic Emirate ought to engage directly with the world and neighboring nations so that Pakistan does not seize the opportunity to engage the world regarding Afghanistan;
• Pakistan talks about crisis management and playing contradictory roles, but gaining the satisfaction of the great powers in international politics and direct interaction with them gives the Emirate the opportunity to get rid of this hostile policy of Pakistan;
• A conducive environment for national reconciliation amongst Afghans, both within and outside Afghanistan, should be fostered by the Islamic Emirate to foster enduring peace and stability in Afghanistan, precluding the utilization of Afghans as pawns for armed endeavors against the Afghan government in the future.
Conclusion:
The opportunity given to the Islamic Emirate to rule Afghanistan again in contemporary Afghan history has rarely occurred. The Islamic Emirate must initiate a long-term and meaningful dialogue with Pakistan founded on mutual interests to address Pakistan’s genuine concerns through collaborative endeavors. Consequently, Pakistan should comprehend the present realities of Afghanistan in line with the principles of good neighborliness and relinquish this adversarial policy.
Now, it is a significant opportunity for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to engage directly with eastern and western countries based on Afghanistan’s national interests. By doing so, Afghanistan can circumvent the unfavorable policies of destructive nations and create opportunities to complete vital projects, establish itself as a partner on the global stage, and break free from reliance on external entities.
